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THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO
"ACCIDENTAL MEANS" POLICIES IN CALIFORNIA
By RussELL A. THOMSON*
BECAUSE OF the multifarious nature of fact situations to which
the word "accident" may be applied, this word has never become a
well-defined, technical legal term.- Indeed, a satisfactory definition is
remarkbly elusive. At the very least, however, an accident is an even-
tuality causing losses which may be insured against in various kinds of
insurance contracts.2 It is the possibility of an accident for which the
insured pays over his money and the fact of its occurrence which he
must establish to recover under the policy. Yet it is often difficult to
know whether a particular occurrence, once loss is suffered, was con-
templated by the parties as being covered by the policy. For example:
A man throws himself Out of a moving vehicle onto a crowded highway
and is run over by a passing truck and killed.3 A man challenges a
stranger to fisticuffs, is knocked down and dies from striking his head
on a paved sidewalk.4 A building contractor purchases and installs
aluminum doors and they fail to function properly.5 Are these losses
accidental? In California the answer is "yes." This comment is to sug-
gest that that answer may be the result of an unfortunate approach to
the interpretation of accident policies.
An insurance policy is a contract. Because of the elusive quality
just mentioned, a policy which insures against losses from accidents is
a contract at the very basis of which is an ill-defined or ambiguous con-
cept.6 Therefore, when injury or death occurs under a fact situation
not previously litigated, and the insurer denies liability, the resulting
lawsuit may be approached by the court in either of two ways: (1) a
judicial interpretation of the terminology of the policy based on legal
Member, Second Year class.
'Arquin v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 Ill. 220, -, 181 N.E. 613, 614 (1932); 52
A.L.R.2d 1083, 1085 (1957); 1 CJ.S. 425 (1936).
2 These include "personal" accident and health policies, comprehensive liability
policies, and double indemnity clauses of life policies.
3 Cox v. Prudential Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 629, 343 P.2d 99 (1959).
4 Rooney v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, 74 Cal. App. 2d 885, 170 P.2d
72 (1946).
rGeddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d
881 (1959).
6 "In every contract of risk shifting, three elements are conspicuously present: First,
one party possesses an interest susceptible of pecuniary estimation; secondly, that interest
is subject to some well-defined peril or perils ...; thirdly, there is an assumption of
this risk of loss by the other party to the contract." VANCE, INSuRANCE § 1 (3d ed. 1951).
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definitions to be found in previous decisions, i.e., a resolution of the
ambiguous nature of the word "accident" based on words and the defi-
nitions accorded them by the judiciary; (2) or alternatively, by a de-
termination of the intentions of the parties at the time they entered
into the agreement, i.e., what risks did they intend to be covered? The
latter method is generally used in contract cases involving ambiguities.-
The former method has been used by the California courts in accident
insurance cases. To illustrate this method, to point out its inconsist-
encies, and to suggest, by implication, that it has had an undesirable
and unexpected effect is the purpose of this comment. Most of the
leading cases, it will be seen, have relied on judicial definitions given
in prior opinions. This is the essence of the California approach and
it is therefore unavoidable that the most quoted definitions be recited
here. That there has been a lack of attention to the intentions of the
contracting parties must be assumed because its absence cannot be
documented.
In General'
Early policies were simple in form and merely covered "accidental
death or injury" or "death or injury caused by accident."9 Most courts
felt that the word "accident" should be given its popular meaning and
looked to dictionary definitions for it."° Under this state of affairs pro-
tection under accident policies was extended to almost any unintended
or unexpected result of a course of conduct, including a great many
injuries as to which the insurer probably had not contemplated liability.
Attempting, therefore, to limit liability by defining more precisely the
risk insured, most insurers eliminated the term "accidental death or
injury" or "death or injury by accident" and substituted the phrase
"injury or death by accidental means" or some variant thereof.' This
situation may be seen as a dialogue between the insurer, on the one
hand, seeking to limit his liability by terminology which would define
more concretely the risks it intended to assume, and the courts, on the
other hand, seeking to broaden the protection of the insured by inter-
pretation of those terms. Judicial definitions of the terms, however,
resulted in attenuating the already elusive quality of the word "acci-
dent."12 That at least was, and continues to be the state of things in
California, where, for example, the courts always insist verbally that
there is a distinction between the terms "accidental death or injury"
and "death or injury by accidental means," become preoccupied with
See 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS 2, 13, 23 (1951).







enunciating the supposed distinction, and then, ultimately, ignore the
significance of what they have said.
A Precedent Unheeded
In Richards v. Travelers' Ins. Co.13 ("external, violent and acci-
dental means"), decided in 1891, the insured, under the view of the
facts least favorable to recovery, was assaulted and struck by an assail-
ant who had failed to be successful in a blackmail attempt. The insured
died from the blows inflicted. The opinion recognized, but did not
emphasize, a distinction between the terms "death by accident" and
"death by accidental means." The court said, ". . . the jury had the
right, under the evidence, to find it 'accidental' within the general
covenants of the policy."' 4 [Emphasis added.] It is important to note
that the court discussed the meaning of the word "accident," not the
term "accidental means," and stated that it must be given its popular
meaning; "... . that is a casualty-something out of the usual course of
events, and which happens suddenly and unexpectedly, and without
any design on the part of the person injured."' 5 There is no mention
of whether the word "accidental" modifies "means" or "result." This
was very possibly due to the circumstances that, under either phrase,
there would be recovery. The Richards approach to "accidental means"
will be referred to again, but it should be pointed out that the same
court, in 1920, recited this quotation with the remark, ".... this language
being taken from Richards v. Travelers' Ins. Co. [citation omitted],
and covering what is known in accident insurance law as an accidental
death, as differentiated from a death by accidental means." 6 [Empha-
sis added.]
Another aspect of the court's thinking in Richards was the court's
agreement with Ripley v. Railway Passengers Assur. Co.' 7 where it was
said that in construing a policy of insurance against accident issued to
all sorts of people who do not, as the company knows, nicely weigh the
meaning of words and terms used in it, courts ought to interpret the
contract as the ordinary man, not versed in lexicology, would regard
its terms and scope. "That which occurs to them unexpectedly is by
them called "accident.'-1s
The Richards case has often been quoted as authority, but, as will
be seen, the thinking of the court has generally been ignored.
A Judicial Distinction Between "Means" and "Result"
In Rock v. Travelers Ins. Co.19 the court dealt with "accidental
means" in an entirely different manner, and thereby introduced a legal
'3 89 Cal. 170, 26 Pae. 762 (1891).
14 Id. at 175, 26 Pac. at 763.
IS Ibid.
16 Olinsky v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 182 Cal. 669, 671, 189 Pac. 835, 836 (1920).
.720 Fed. Cas. 823, 825 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1870).
18 89 Cal. 170, 176, 26 Pac. 762, 763 (1891).
2' 172 Cal. 462, 156 Pac. 1029 (1916).
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distinction between this phrase and "accidental death or injury."
The insured, attending a funeral, helped to carry a heavy casket
down a narrow staircase. He collapsed immediately afterwards and
later died from acute dilation of the heart. In holding that there was
no liability, the court emphasized the lack of evidence of any unusual
or unexpected occurrence in the deceased's action, such as a loss of
balance, or a slip by the insured while the burden was being trans-
ported. The court insisted: 20
The policy does not insure against accidental death or injuries, but
against injuries effected by accidental means. A differentiation is
made, therefore, between the result to the insured and the means
which is the operative cause in producting this result. It is not
enough that death or injury should be unexpected or unforeseen, but
there must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act
or occurrence which leads to the injury or death. Thus in Clidero v.
Scottish Accident Ins. Co., 29 Scot. L. R. 303 Lord Adam said: "...
The question is, in the words of this policy, whether the means by
which the injury was caused were accidental means." (Emphasis
added.)
In disagreeing with a case which held that "any unusual and un-
expected event attending the performance of a usual and necessary
act"21 would be covered under such terminology, the Rock court said,
"to our minds it fails to give effect to the plain language of the policy,
in that it does not distinguish between the result to the insured and the
means by which that result was brought about."22 (Emphasis added.)
In Rock, death by "accidental means" is not established.
Without going into the question of the desirability of recognizing,
or construing, such a distinction, it should be noted that the court is
here pointing out that a perfectly logical differentiation can be made
between accidental result and accidental means which turns on the
"voluntariness" of the insured's behavior. It is not stated in these
words, but the question becomes: "Was the act causing injury volun-
tary?" To derive a logical answer, therefore, only the behavior of the
insured should be looked at. The court is saying that, in an "accidental
means" policy, cause must be separated from effect and that the effect,
or result, is irrelevant, having no bearing on recovery other than to
establish the loss. The "means," or cause of loss, can be accidental only
where some involuntary, physical act of the insured is shown to be in-
cluded and causally significant in the series or complex of acts which
comprises the insured's behavior. In that series of acts, was there any
mishap or unwilled act such as a slip, stumble or loss of balance? If so.
and if it was causally connected to the resultant injury, then there wa,
20 Id. at 465, 156 Pac. at 1030.
21 Id. at 467, 156 Pac. at 1031.
22 Ibid.
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accident in the means and there may be recovery. Otherwise, there
should be no recovery.
Of course, this line of reasoning was not spelled out by the court
as it is here. In requiring something unexpected in the means, the
court did not say that it had to be an "involuntary act" by the insured.
Failure to do this blurred the incisiveness of the distinction which had
been established. As will be seen, subsequent decisions quote the
phrase "something unexpected in the preceding act or occurrence"
while, at the same time, they imply that that "something unexpected"
can be an unwished-for result.
In Postler v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,23 another "accidental means" case
decided by the same court, in the same year, there was no emphasis
upon a distinction between terms; but this was a case in which recovery
would be denied under either type of policy.24 Nevertheless, it was
unfortunate that this decision was made to turn on whether the result,
the insured's death, was ".... the natural and probable consequence of
his own voluntary acts"25 rather than the question of whether the in-
sured's voluntary act of assaulting another at gunpoint was, or was not,
the "means" or cause of his being shot, i.e., whether the shot was a
supervening cause of death, which of course it was not. To say, with-
out emphasis on the causal chain, that ". . . it still remains that such
shooting was the consequence naturally to be anticipated.. ."2 allows
a shift of thought from "means" to "result," which was no help in giving
force to the distinction established in Rock. [Emphasis added.]
On the other hand, the distinction was clearly understood in Olin-
sky v. Railway Mail Ass'n,27 where the insured went swimming and
attempted to swim against a very strong current, suffered a series of
hemorrhages and died. The court denied recovery under this "acci-
dental means" policy because, as in Rock, there was no evidence that
the insured slipped or that any similar mishap occurred. Everything,
therefore, was done voluntarily. It was stated that there is a clear dis-
tinction between accidental death and death by accidental means and
the court referred to the definition of "accident" given in Richards, viz:
"... a casualty-something out of the usual course of events, and which
happens suddenly and unexpectedly and without any design on the
part of the person injured"28 as being accidental death which must be
differentiated from death by accidental means and which is not suffi-
cient for recovery under the latter terminology.
23 173 Cal. 1, 158 Pac. 1022 (1916).
24 The insured demanded, at gun point, reimbursement for his losses. He was killed
in an exchange of shots which his demand precipitated.
25 173 Cal. at 4, 158 Pac. at 1024.
26 Id. at 5, 158 Pac. at 1024.
27182 Cal. 669, 189 Pac. 835, (1920).
28 Id. at 671, 189 Pac. at 836.
Nov., 1961] COMMENTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Two years later, Ogilvie v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 29 quite consistently
held an instruction to be erroneous which failed to make sufficient dis-
tinction between the terms. The erroneous instruction was: "... [T]he
term 'accident,' as used in the policy here in question ... denotes an
event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation,... or is
an unusual effect of a known cause, and therefore not expected....
It is an event happening unexpectedly or undesignedly."30
Transition
That a workable distinction existed, therefore, is undeniable. Nev-
ertheless, courts in the next few years did not succeed in clarifying it
or in giving substance to it. In Horton v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,3 ' the dis-
trict court of appeal dealt with a case of blood poisoning caused by the
use of septic dental instruments for which recovery was sought under
an "accidental means" policy. The court agreed, in a long discussion
of the terms, that "... the means must be accidental, and that a mere
accidental result would not suffice under the language of this pol-
icy...." 3 2 Such accidental means are logically established, however,
because :33
It doubtless is true that the insured knowingly and intentionally per-
mitted the dentist to introduce the dental instruments into his mouth,
but he did not know that he was permitting germ-infected instruments
to be used in his mouth. The result, the death of the insured, was not
the natural and probable consequence of using sterilized and asceptic
instruments.
Thus, the foreseeability of the result becomes an essential element
of the means.
Fusion of "Means" and "Result"
While the only differentiation which could logically be construed
depended upon semantics and was an analytical separation of the act
from its result, this was not fully grasped in Horton3 4 or in Harloe v.
California State Life Ins. Co.,3 "' which affirmed the trial court's action
in sustaining a general demurrer to a complaint which alleged that the
insured in the course of his employment, had been required to go out-
side of the derrick in which he was working in order to repair a water
line. The outside temperature was 110'. The insured suffered a sun-
stroke which caused his death. There being no evidence of anything
involuntary or "unconsented-to," it was perfectly consistent with Rock,
29 189 Cal. 406, 209 Pac. 26 (1922).
30 Id. at 412, 209 Pac. at 28.
31 45 Cal. App. 462, 187 Pac. 1070 (1920).
32 Id. at 467, 189 Pae. at 1072.
3 Ibid.
34Ibid.
35 206 Cal. 141, 273 Pac. 560 (1928).
[Vol. 13
Olinsky and Ogilvie to find that death by "accidental means" was not
as a matter of law established. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the court
misunderstood the basic thought of those cases because it offered as its
reason for citing them the statement, similar to that of the Horton case,
that those cases ".... require a holding in the instant case that an effect
which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of
action cannot be said to be produced by accidental means." 6
It is enlightening to compare this statement with the same court's
holding six years earlier in Ogilvie. In that case, the trial court's in-
struction was to the effect that an accident denotes an event without
one's foresight or expectation, or which is an unusual effect of a known
cause and therefore not expected. "It is an event happening unex-
pectedly or undesignedly."3 7 But to say, as in Harloe, that ". . . an
effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course
of action cannot be said to be produced by accidental means" 8 is to
say the same thing in a different way. One statement is positive and
the other negative. If the facts in Harloe had warranted it, the court
might have said that prior cases require a holding that an effect which
is not the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of
action can be said to be produced by accidental means. The point is
that the instruction in Ogilvie was grounds for a new trial because
it failed to distinguish between accidental "means" and accidental
"result."
In Moore v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,3 9 a nurse contracted blood poison-
ing through streptococci germs "flying from" the patient she was at-
tending. There was no evidence of mishap or unintentional failure on
her part to take the usual precautions. She was more careful, probably,
than most in her profession. The infection occurred, as far as the evi-
dence shows, from mere contact with the patient. Other persons ex-
posed to the patient did not contract the germs. The court's opinion
began with the Richards definition of the term "accident," which was
said in Olinsky to be the definition of "accidental death" as distin-
guished from "accidental means." It next quoted Rock to the effect
that there must be something unexpected in the preceding act or oc-
curence. The court then concluded that, while exposure of an ordinary
person to infection of a communicable disease would have as its usual
and expected consequence a contraction of the disease, such a result
would be "unusual, improbable and unexpected" in regard to the
".... experienced and safeguarded physician or nurse in a modern hos-
pital.... .,40 The closest the court came to finding an accident in the
means, in the sense of Rock, Olinsky and Ogilvie, was that others were
30 Id. at 142, 273 Pac. at 560.
37 189 Cal. at 412, 209 Pac. at 28.
38206 Cal. 141, 273 Pac. 560 (1928).
39 203 Cal. 465, 265 Pac. 207, (1928).
40 Id. at 473, 265 Pac. at 210.
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exposed to the same patient and were not contaminated. It must be
assumed that something in the nature of a mishap must have occurred
because the result was so unusual.41 At any rate, the court used this
assumption as the basis of its opinion, not requiring further proof of
a mishap in the means. It also stated that the fact that other exposed
persons did not contract the disease had ". . an important bearing
upon the question as to whether the insured's contraction of this in-
fectious disease was the expected or unexpected, the usual or unusual,
consequence of her exposure to infection."42 [Emphasis added.] Even
if this were true, the question was irrelevant according to the same
court's own words in Rock.
43
In Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 44 Six years after Harloe,
the United States Supreme Court also dealt with a case of sunstroke,
and, like the California court, it denied recovery. Unlike Harloe, how-
ever, the U.S. court did not find it apropos to say that "an effect which
is the natural and probable consequence of an act cannot be said to
be produced by accidental means."45 On the contrary, it was much
more in accord with the implications of earlier California opinions
which implied, if they did not say, that for recovery there must be
something unintended or involuntary in the insured's act, such as a slip
or other mishap. The majority opinion states that, in an accidental
means policy, it is not enough that the injury or death be "accidental"
in the understanding of the average man. Nor is it enough that the
result be unforeseen, ". . . for here the carefully chosen words defining
liability distinguish between the result and the external means which
produces it."
4 6
Justice Cardozo's very famous and often cited dissent, however,
declined to recognize a distinction between the terms "death or injury
by accident" and "death or injury by accidental means." He empha-
sized, as the Richards case had done in 1891, the understanding which
the average man would have of the terms. "Sunstroke, though it may
be a disease according to the classification of physicians, is none the
less an accident in the common speech of men";47 and it is the reading
of the policy by the average man ". . that is to be accepted as our
guide, with the help of the established rule that ambiguities and un-
certainties are to be resolved against the company .... The proposed
distinction will not survive the application of that test."48
41 Id. at 476, 265 Pac. at 210.
42 Id. at 475, 265 Pao. at 211.
43 "It is not enough that death or injury should be unexpected or unforeseen ...
The question is, in the words of this policy, whether the means by which the injury was
caused were accidental means." 172 Cal. at 465, 156 Pac. at 1030.
44291 U.S. 491 (1934).
45 206 Cal. 141, 142, 273 Pac. 560 (1928).
46 291 U.S. at 496.
47 Id. at 498.
48 Id. at 499.
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While a differentiation between the terms "injury by accidental
means" and "accidental injury" can be logically established, as has been
pointed out, Cardozo did not recognize it, even for the purpose of dis-
posing of it. His approach was common sense and a consideration of
public policy. Any other construction will only result in confusion. He
said, "The attempted distinction between accidental results and acci-
dental means will plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian bog."49
"If there was no accident in the means, there was none in the result,
for the two were inseparable .... The process of causation was un-
broken from exposure up to death. There was an accident throughout,
or there was no accident at all."5°
Cardozo felt that, "The principle that should govern the intepreta-
tion of the policy in suit was stated with clarity and precision by San-
born, J.... ."
An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or
course of action is not an accident, nor is it produced by accidental
means. It is either the result of actual design, or it falls under the
maxim that every man must be held to intend the natural and prob-
able consequences of his deeds. On the other hand, an effect which
is not the natural or probable consequence of the means which pro-
duced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be
reasonably anticipated from the use of those means, an effect which
the actor did not intend to produce and which he cannot be charged
with the design of producing under the maxim to which we have ad-
verted, is produced by accidental means. It is produced by means
which were neither designed nor calculated to cause it. Such an effect
is not the result of design, cannot be reasonably anticipated, is unex-
pected, and is produced by an unusual combination of fortuitous cir-
cumstances; in other words, it is produced by "accidental means."
[Emphasis added.]"
The Paradox in California
In great measure as a result of Cardozo's dissent, many jurisdic-
tions have either repudiated, or refuse to recognize, a distinction be-
tween the terms.52 California has not repudiated it. Quite the contrary.
California courts since Rock, in 1916, have insisted that there is a clear
49 Ibid. "Whatever kind of a bog that is, we concur," said the Colorado court in
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 235, 67 P.2d 80, 81, 110 A.L.R.
1270, 1274 (1937). Also, that this area of the law is full of conflict, see Sunstroke Cases
in Annot., 61 A.L.R. 1198 (clear split in 1929); Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2d 1093 (preponder-
ance hold sunstroke caused by accidental means in 1954).
W 291 U.S. at 501.
51The quotation is given in the margin of the opinion. 291 U.S. at 501 (1934)
It is from Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smith, 85 Fed. 401 (8th Cir. 1898).
The italicized portion was quoted with approval in California cases, e.g., Postler, Horton,
Davilla, Losleben, and Rooney, all discussed here. But compare the thought of the
quotation with Rock, Olinsky and Ogilvie.
5 2 Annot. 166 A.L.R. 469, 470 (1947).
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and distinct difference. This is not, however, to say that such difference
has not been totally lost sight of. While only one California case is
found in which there is a reference to Cardozo's dissent, most cases
since 1930 have not separated cause from effect. While insisting that
a clear distinction exists 5 3 it is to be shown that the California courts
have actually abandoned the attempt to apply it. Unfortunately, this
has not been accomplished by a reference to common-sense or policy
considerations which were fundamental to Cardozo's dissent. On the
contrary, one must wonder if it has not been by the very process of
preoccupation with and searching scrutiny of definitions, words, and
phrases quoted from prior cases and eclectically pieced together that
California has abolished the distinction without repudiating it. It may
even be said that this preoccupation has had the paradoxical result of
turning a device, the original purpose of which was to limit liability,
into a device for broadening liability beyond the scope of the original
phrase, "death or injury by accident."
As evidence of this it is instructive to study the opinion in Davilla
v. Liberty Life Ins. Co.,5 4 or at least that imposing section of the opinion
which is a collation of quotations dealing with the meaning of the
term "accidental means." This excerpt is lengthy, but it is an important
illustration, indeed the non plus ultra, of that thought process which
resulted, except for the court's insistence that a distinction exists, in
being identical with Cardozo's observation on cause and effect that,
"there was an accident throughout, or there was no accident at all.."
5
5
The facts of the Davilla case are that a policeman, while travelling
by motorcycle, was confronted about two hundred feet ahead by an
automobile which had suddenly stopped in the intersection with its
front about the center line of the street. The policeman applied his
brakes when eighty to one hundred feet away from the automobile
and first swerved to the front and then towards the rear of the auto-
mobile. When ten or fifteen feet away from it, the motorcycle skidded
from under the insured, throwing him to the pavement along which he
slid till his head hit the right rear wheel of the automobile. This re-
sulted in his death. Who would doubt that the policeman's death was
accidental? The court agreed that it was accidental, but found it ex-
53 "A differentiation is made, therefore, between the result to the insured and the
means which is the operative cause in producing this result." Rock v. Travelers' Ins.
Co., 172 Cal. at 465, 156 Pac. at 1030. Quoted in Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 114
Cal. App. 308, 313, 299 Pac. 831, 833 (1931) and also Losleben v. California State Life
Ins. Co., 133 Cal. App. 550, 555, 24 P.2d 825, 827 (1933). "In a proper case, that
distinction should be made." Zuckerman v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 42 Cal.
2d 460, 476-77, 267 P.2d 777, 787 (1954). "Caused by accident is the phrase to be
interpreted here; not accidental means.... "' Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App.
2d 245, 252, 286 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1955). "A differentiation is made .... ." Cox v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 172 Cal .App. 2d 629, 635, 343 P.2d 99, 102 (1959).
54 114 Cal. App. 308, 299 Pac. 831 (1931).
5 291 U.S. at 501.
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pedient to approach this conclusion by a process of compiling judicial
definitions:56
"The policy, it will be observed, does not insure against accidental
death or injuries, but against injuries effected by accidental means. A
differentiation is made, therefore, between the result to the insured
and the means which is the operative cause in producing this result.
It is not enough that death or injury should be unexpected or unfore-
seen, but there must be some element of unexpectedness in the pre-
ceding act or occurrence which leads to the injury or death." Rock
v. Travelers Ins. Co. 7 ... "Where the death is the result of some act,
but was not designed and not anticipated by the deceased, though it
be in consequence of some act voluntarily done by him, it is acci-
dental death.
Where death is caused by some act of the deceased not designed
by him, or not intentionally done by him, it is death by accidental
means. In other words, accidental death is an unintended and unde-
signed result, arising from acts done; death by accidental means is
where the result arises from acts unintentionally done." Pledger v.
Business Men's Acc. Ass'n of Texas5s . . .quoted with approval in
Olinsky v. Railway Mail Ass'n,. . . followed in Ogilvie v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., supra. "An effect which is the natural and probable conse-
quence of an act or course of action cannot be said to be produced
by accidental means." Harloe v. California State Life Ins. Co....
'Without doubt, there can be no recovery if the insured does a vol-
untary act the natural, usual and to-be-expected result of which is to
bring injury upon himself. An injury or death so occurring is not
produced by 'accidental means' in any sense of the word, legal or
colloquial." Lickleider v. Iowa State Travelling Mees Ass'n.59 In
Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v. Smithrc ... a leading case, it
is said that the term "accidental means" is descriptive of "means which
produce effects which are not their natural and probable conse-
quences . . ." quoted in Horton v. Travelers' Ins. Co. "The term
'accidental means' depends for its application upon the facts of each
particular case; since what would be an unusual or improbable con-
sequence, an unexpected or unforeseen occurrence in one set of cir-
cumstances in which the assured might be placed, would be the usual,
the expected, and in all human probability the foreseen consequence
affecting the assured in another set of circumstances." Moore v. Fidel-
ity & Cas. Co.... If the injury to an insured person results in some
greater or less degree from his own acts, and the evidence be such
that the jury may fairly find that such result is one which he did not
and could not have reasonably anticipated, and did not intend to
produce, it is an accident, and is caused by accidental means. Jenkins
58 114 Cal. App. at 313-15, 299 Pac. at 833-34.
7 Citations of California cases omitted.
58 197 S.W. 889, 890 (Tex. Div. App. 1917).
59 184 Iowa 423, 166 N.W. 363, 168 N.W. 884 (1918).
60 85 Fed. 401 (8th Cir. 1898).
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v. Hawkeye C.M. Ass'n;6' Western Commercial Travelers' Ass'n v.
Smith.62 [Emphasis added.]
It should be noted that the Lickleider case represents the law in
Iowa, but conflicted squarely with previous California case law. The
following quotation expresses the thoughts of that court as to the
distinction: 68
According to [another alleged] definition, if correctly interpreted by
counsel for the defense, an injury happening to the insured through
his own voluntary act is not an accident, nor is his hurt to be attrib-
uted to accidental means-a proposition which is wholly at variance
with every statement of the true rule .... [Emphasis added.]
This excerpt from Davilla was repeated in its entirety two years
later in Losleben v. California State Life Ins. Co.,64 where the insured,
apparently in good health at the time, jumped down from a bench
three feet high. This effort resulted in a twist in his small intestine,
peritonitis, and death. After the Davilla excerpt was recited, the court
held that if there was some evidence which justified "the inference""
that the means which produced the injury contained something of an
unexpected character, then the resulting injury could be said to be
caused through accidental means. The needed evidence was found in
the resultant injury, since a jump of three feet usually doesn't have such
result. It was also decided that the following instruction was not
grounds for reversal, the court stating that any error was cured by
other instructions: 66
You are instructed that, if you find from the evidence that the insured
did a voluntary act, the natural, usual and to-be-expected result of
which was not to produce injury to himself, but that there flowed
from said act an unforeseen and unexpected means through which the
injury was sustained, or the death produced, then you will find that
the death was caused by accidental means.
67
It is perfectly clear from Losleben that the result, if unexpected, is
enough to find that the means was accidental, just as indicated by
Cardozo.
61 147 Iowa 113, 124 N.W. 199 (1910).
62 85 Fed. 401 (8th Cir. 1898).
63 184 Iowa at 429, 166 N.W. at 366.
64 133 Cal. App. 550, 554-56, 24 P.2d 825, 827 (1933).
65 Plaintiff, as his prima facie case, must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the injury was caused by "accidental means." E.g., Rock v. Travelers' Ins.
Co., 172 Cal. 462, 464, 156 Pac. 1029, 1030 (1916); Ells v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers, 20 Cal. 2d 290, 304, 125 P.2d 457, 464 (1942).
66 133 Cal. App. at 557, 24 P.2d at 828.
67 The Pacific Reporter headnote [key number 296 (2)] states: "Instructions held
not erroneous . . . as justifying recovery under policy for death by accidental means, if
result of insured's voluntary act was unexpected, irrespective whether means which pro-
duced injury were unexpected." 24 P.2d 825.
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The Davilla and Losleben cases have been frequently cited as
authoritative. 68 Nevertheless, no court has yet said that the distinction
between the terms is other than a clear one in this state.
Recent Cases: The "Serbonian Bog"?
Rooney v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Assn.69
In 1916, in Postler v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,70 the insured assaulted
another while attempting to recover his gambling losses. His victim
shot and killed him. There was no recovery because the shooting was
the consequence naturally to be anticipated.
In 1945, Mr. Rooney got in an argument with a stranger in George's
Chili Parlor and invited him to fisticuffs to "settle" the matter. When
outside, Rooney attempted to strike the stranger but the latter suc-
ceeded in hitting Rooney, causing him to fall to the concrete or paved
sidewalk whereby he sustained injuries to the head from which he
died. At trial, there was a directed verdict for plaintiff under Rooney's
"accidental means" policy. The appeals court stated that the principal
question was whether the evidence justified the trial court in conclud-
ing that a verdict for defendant would be so lacking in evidentiary
support that it would have to be set aside as a matter of law, and gave
the question an affirmative answer. The court did so by interpreting
the facts in terms of proximate cause, thereby effecting a separation of
the insured aggressor's intentional embroilment in fisticuffs and the fact
that the fisticuffs resulted in his death. This allowed it to examine the
sequence of events as though they were disparate elements. Foresee-
ability of result was also emphasized. The court decided that Rooney
could have foreseen that he might be struck by his opponent but not
that he would be knocked down. And, of course, "he was not killed by
a blow from the fist of his antagonist. Death resulted from falling and
striking his head."71 The court pointed out the approval, in Horton, of
"... the definition of accidental means as ... descriptive of means
which produce effects which are not their natural and probable con-
sequences." 72 The Rooney decision also cited Davilla.7 3 Plaintiff re-
covered.
68 E.g., Ells v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 20 Cal. 2d 290, 125 P.2d 457
(1942); Cox v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 172 Cal. App. 2d 629, 343 P.2d 99
(1959); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955); Miller
v. United Ins. Co., 113 Cal. App. 2d 493, 248 P.2d 113 (1952); Rooney v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Ace. Ass'n, 74 Cal. App. 2d 885, 170 P.2d 72 (1946); Dark v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 338, 40 P.2d 906 (1935); Byers v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
Cal., 133 Cal. App. 632, 24 P.2d 829 (1933).
69 74 Cal. App. 2d 885, 170 P.2d 72 (1946).
70 173 Cal. 1, 158 Pac. 1022 (1916).
71 Contra, in addition to Postler, Sweeney v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 767, 92 P.2d 1043 (1937); Gray v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 214 Cal.
695, 8 P.2d 126 (1932).
7274 Cal. App. 2d at 889, 170 P.2d at 74.
73 Ibid.
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Stokes v. Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n1 4
In 1922, in Ogilvie,7 5 the insured may have hit some unseen ob-
struction while plowing which caused a severe "wrench," a heart at-
tack and death. The appellate court held that the trial court should
have given the jury the defendant's proposed instruction that if the
insured received a strain as a result of the sway or swinging of the
plow, and there was no more lurch or sway or swing than is ordinarily
incident to the character of plowing, then the means of death would
not be accidental.
In 1951, Mr. Stokes, a professional fireman for twenty-eight years,
collapsed while fighting a fire inside a building. Dense smoke, extreme
heat and high carbon monoxide content caused a coronary occlusion
which resulted in death. The majority opinion dealt principally with
the question of whether pre-existing disease would relieve the insurer
from liability. As to "accidental means," the majority decision found
that the major fire, the intense heat, the carbon monoxide, the fall 70
and the extreme smoky conditions were accidental means. On rehear-
ing, the court cited cases where one does not recover because his ac-
tions were voluntary and decided that this rule is inapplicable to the
facts of this case because the fire developed hidden, unknown and un-
expected danger and his exposure to that which happened was not
voluntary. The opinion was bolstered by the statement, "It cannot be
said that Stokes intended to produce that which happened."7" (Em-
phasis added.]
Cox v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America.78
This action, under an "accidental means" policy, was tried without
a jury. The insured's widow and orphaned children recovered.
The facts were that the insured, having been arrested by two police
officers on a charge of forgery, was being transported by automobile
from Oakland to Southern California. He sat on the right side of the
rear seat, one of the officers beside him while the other drove. The
rear doors were locked, and the prisoner was not handcuffed. The
automobile, going South, travelled in the inside lane of a four lane
highway. They were gradually passing a sixty foot long truck, which
was about four feet to the right of the police automobile. Under these
circumstances, the insured, Cox, unlocked the door, threw it open and
started out of the vehicle. An officer grabbed his shirt. Cox twisted
around, pulled away, and stepped backward out of the door. He im-
mediately fell on his back and bounced a little. At this point he was
"approximately forty-five feet from the front and fifteen feet from the
back" of the truck. He lay lengthwise of the highway for "two or three
74 109 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 928, 243 P.2d 144 (1952).
75 189 Cal. 406, 209 Pac. 26 (1922).
76 Stokes collapsed. There was no evidence that he slipped or stumbled.
77 109 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 935, 243 P.2d at 150.
,8 172 Cal. App. 2d 629, 343 P.2d 99 (1959).
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seconds."79 Then he raised the upper part of his body and turned his
head toward the north. When the rear wheels were within two or
three feet of Cox, he "just sort of threw himself or rolled" to the right
and under the left rear wheel of the truck.
The opinion begins by drawing a distinction between accidental
death and accidental means, and quoted Olinsky in what it calls the
"uniform rule-well stated... [that] ... accidental death is an unin-
tended and undesigned result, arising from acts unintentionally done."so
It also quoted Rock: "It is not enough that death or injury should be
unexpected or unforeseen, but there must be some element of unex-
pectedness in the preceding act or occurrence which leads to the injury
or death."81 Then there is a change in thought; Rooney was quoted:
"To prevent a recovery upon such a policy [accidental means policy],
it must be made to appear that in utilizing the means to which he re-
sorted the insured knew or should have known that he would probably
sustain the injury which resulted as a consequence thereof."82 Losleben
was quoted:83
While an injury to the insured person may result in greater or less
degree from an original voluntary act upon his part, if there is some
evidence which justifies the inference" that the means which pro-
duced the injury contained something of an unexpected or unforeseen
character involving other acts not intentionally done, the resulting
injury may be said to be caused through accidental means.
How shall the court find something unexpected in the act causing
injury? It grants that, since Cox clearly got out of the automobile
voluntarily, then his landing on his feet, falling backward and lying
lengthwise on the highway for two or three seconds"3 were not caused
by accidental means. But up to that point there is no evidence that
he was fatally injuredl The fall onto the highway did not kill him. The
court then states: 6
There was evidence that after he had lain lengthwise of the highway
for two or three seconds he raised the upper part of his body and
7
9 The court's decision turns on this fact; but it should be noted that if the truck
were moving 25 m.p.h. and Cox had fallen at the very front of the truck and rested there
for two seconds, the truck would have to be about 75 feet long before its tail would pass
him. If three seconds, about 112 feet long. Under the facts accepted by the court, Cox
could remain where he fell for less than one-half second before being run over by the
rear wheels.
80 172 Cal. App. 2d at 634, 343 P.2d at 102.
81 Id. at 635, 343 P.2d at 102.
82Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 For plaintiff's burden of proof see Ells v. Order of United Commercial Travelers,
20 Cal. 2d at 304, 125 P.2d at 464; Rock v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 172 Cal. at 464, 156
Pac. at 1030.
85 That this could not be correct, see note 79, supra.
so 172 Cal. App. 2d at 636, 343 P.2d at 103.
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turned his head toward approaching traffic. At that point in the at-
tempted escape, he was not in the traffic lane where the transport
truck was travelling. If he had remained at that place on the highway
the truck would not have run over him.17 He was killed after he
threw himself or rolled to the right under the truck. It thus appears
that the circumstances ... presented a question of fact as to whether
he was intending to place his head in front of the truck wheel, or
whether he was attempting to avoid being struck by the wheel. The
presumption is against suicide .... The trial judge could infer that
Cox did not anticipate that, as a result of going to the right, he would
be run over by the truck .... As stated in the Losleben case . . . it
cannot be said, as a matter of law, "that the only means through which
the injury occurred were those which the insured intended to em-
ploy."88
The court refers to two cases89 where the deceased voluntarily
stepped or jumped from automobiles, but distinguishes them because:
1) the insureds sustained their fatal injuries as a direct result of falling
on the pavement, and there was no injury by reason of an "intervening
agency,"90 and 2) because they were cases in other jurisdictions de-
cided in 1930 and 1946.91 In one 92 of these cases, except for the fact
that death resulted from a skull fracture inflicted when the insured hit
the ground, the facts were identical to the Cox situation. That court,
however, while granting that any unambiguous clause should be con-
strued in favor of the insured, said, ". . . when injury or death follows
or results from a voluntary act of the insured, and the act is one which
is manifestly dangerous, and one which is not ordinarily done or per-
formed without serious consequences to the doer, such result is not
caused by accidental means." 93
For some reason that is difficult to appreciate, the court, in the
closing paragraphs of the Cox opinion, quotes a comment in 166 AMER-
ICAN LAW REPORTS 469 including several lines from Cardozo's Landress
87 There was an automobile travelling behind the police car in the inner lane, and
"the usual heavy traffic for Saturday afternoon."
88 172 Cal. App. 2d at 636, 343 P.2d at 103.
89 Sizemore v. National Cas. Co., 108 W. Va. 550, 151 S.E. 841 (1930); Zuliskey
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 159 Pa. Super. 363, 48 A.2d 141 (1946).
90 172 Cal. App. 2d at 637, 343 P.2d at 103. That an "intervening cause" is not op-
erating in one's presence at the time one acts, see McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39
HARV. L. REv. 149, 198-99 (1925).
91 Cases cited by this court were decided in 1916, 1920, 1933 and 1946.
92 Sizemore v. National Cas. Co., 108 W. Va. 550, 151 S.E. 841 (1930).
93 In Price v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 169 Cal. 800, 803, 147 Pac. 1175, 1176
(1915) the court adopted this quotation: "Where a person thus invites another to a
deadly encounter, and does so voluntarily, his death, if he sustains a mortal wound,
cannot be regarded as accidental, by any definition of that term which has heretofore
been adopted. It might as well be claimed that death is accidental when a man intention-




dissent. The court's purpose in doing this is hard to understand. This
line of the quote, however, is easily comprehended: "This whole branch
of insurance law has become shrouded in a semantic and polemical
maze. .... .94
Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co.05
This was not a personal accident policy but a comprehensive, or
"products" liability policy, but Justice Traynor's opinion is based on,
and cites, several of the leading cases discussed above. Defendant
promised "to pay... all sums which the insured shall become obligated
to pay by reason of liability imposed upon him... because of injury to
or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by
accident." 96 Whether the losses suffered by its insured's customer were
"caused by accident" is the crucial issue. The facts are that the plain-
tiff, a building contractor, ordered and received from the insured, a
manufacturer, 760 aluminum doors, door jambs, and attached hard-
ware. After they were installed defects appeared, in some doors within
a few days and in others after various periods of time up to six months.
Some doors couldn't be closed and others could not be opened. Re-
placements were unsuitable, i.e., twenty-two doors to be used on bath-
rooms were equipped with chimes and letter drops.
The majority opinion seeks to define the word "accident." It is de-
cided that an accident must be an event which takes place suddenly,
unexpectedly and undesignedly and that the loss which occurred here
could be so described. This is because the door failures were not the
result of normal deterioration; "Moreover, they occurred suddenly...
although it may have taken many months for all the doors to fail and
fall apart, it is clear that each door, when it failed, failed suddenly. At
one moment it was a usable door, at the next it was not."97
Conclusions
The factors which should, in a general way, govern judicial con-
struction of accident policies have often been discussed by writers and
courts of other jurisdictions98 and are not dealt with here except to say
that many of them are implicit in the California case of Richards v.
Travelers' Ins. Co.99 which was decided before the turn of the century.
The point is that, in California, the distinction between the terms
"death or injury by accident" and "death or injury by accidental means"
is said to exist, but it is illusory. It does not exist. Verbal insistence to
04 172 Cal. App. 2d at 638, 343 P.2d at 164.
5 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (1959).
06 Id. at 562, 334 P.2d at 883.
07 Id. at 564, 334 P.2d at 885.
98 Zinn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 6 Wash. 2d 379, 107 P.2d 921 (1940);
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P.2d 80 (1937); 24 Tenn.
L. Rev. 574 (1956); 27 B.U.L. REv. 306 (1947).
99 89 Cal. 17.0, 26 Pac. 762 (1891).
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the contrary is bound to result in unsuccessful semantics and a confused
preoccupation with terminology. The most important implication of
this process, however, is a consequent distraction of attention from the
fundamental problem of elucidating the nature of the risk involved in
such policies; i.e., what is an accident?
While the answers must perhaps be conjectural, it ought specifi-
cally to be asked whether an esoteric approach to the terminology of
accident policies, rather than an exoteric approach such as is usually
applied to ambiguous contracts, i.e., the understanding of the average
policyholder, has not resulted in:
(1) A broadening of the term "accidental means" to include situa-
tions which would not be covered even under the term "death or in-
jury by accident"?
(2) Likelihood that the word accident will be deprived of any
useful meaning?
(3) Failure to elucidate the nature of the risk insured, which risk
is basic to the actuarial computations affecting both the insurer and
the insured?
